One of Africa’s wealthiest and business moguls, Aliko Dangote, has announced the establishment of a million-dollar agro-industrial sugar refinery in Kwame Danso in the Bono Region of Ghana.
This opens a new chapter in Ghana’s agricultural journey, promising a boost in the overall economy of the country. But sadly, the project starkly contrasts with the sorry tale of Ghana’s own Komenda Sugar Factory, which today sits idle, and gradually rusting away, after numerous broken promises by successive governments.
The flagship project is programmed to crush 12,000 tons of sugar cane daily. In addition to the factory is a fully irrigated sugar plantation covering 25,000 hectares to ensure a constant supply of raw materials. The factory, aside from sugar, will produce molasses and ethanol.
“With land secured and necessary permits obtained, we’re moving forward with the support of Ghana’s One District, One Factory Initiative,” the announcement by Chairman of the Dangote Group indicated.
But on the flipside of the coin is the Komenda Sugar Factory. Launched in 2016 and touted as a symbol of Ghanaian self-sufficiency in sugar production, the facility was constructed with a $35 million loan from the Indian government.
The factory was expected to crush 1,250 tons of cane daily. But within weeks of commissioning, it was shut down. Eight years on and after promises upon promises, the factory still remains a monument of abandoned equipment and rotting steel in the Central Region.
The main challenge, as identified, is that the factory has no consistent raw material supply, a working irrigation plan, and adequate management.
While this factory still remains a white elephant, Dangote, seeing the potential in the country’s sugar consumption sector, is stepping in, not to revive Komenda, but to build a new, massive alternative in Kwame Danso.
What Went Wrong at Komenda?
The factory failure is not just technical. Numerous analysts say it is systemic. The factory lacked raw materials as no out-grower scheme was properly established to supply cane.
The facility has also been bedevilled with poor road networks and inconsistent energy supply crippled operations. Chiefs and residents also complain of the lack of broader stakeholder engagement, and they say they were left out of planning, causing resistance and apathy.
Even the recent plan to lease the factory to West African Agro Ltd., an Indian firm, sparked protests from locals over a lack of transparency.
Dangote’s Different Approach
Unlike Komenda, which was largely government-driven, Dangote’s sugar project is private-sector-led, commercially structured, and strategically integrated. So far, the land has been secured with permits acquired, clearing a major regulatory hurdle.
Through a backward Integration model, sugarcane will be grown on-site and nearby through an out-grower system. The facility will also ensure diversification as the plant will produce sugar, ethanol, and molasses, minimizing waste and maximizing profit.
The Expected Benefits
The Dangote-owned factory is a potential employment engine. Thousands of jobs, from farmhands to factory engineers, are expected to be created. It is also a major step in the country’s industrialization agenda.
Moreover, with Ghana importing an average of $160 million worth of sugar annually, this factory is expected to deal with this challenge, which has serious repercussions on the Ghana cedi.
“This isn’t just a factory; it’s a continental transformation tool,” said Dangote in his announcement. “This project addresses Ghana’s annual $162 million sugar import bill, fostering a local, sustainable, and impactful solution.”
The Irony
There is something painfully ironic in the fact that a Nigerian billionaire is succeeding in building the exact kind of factory Ghana has failed to make work. It raises hard questions about the country’s industrial development strategy. Why should a foreign investor have more faith, better results, and stronger coordination than the state itself?
The Bottomline
All hope is not lost yet. The current government has shown interest in the company, although the country is yet to see action. To save the $35 million facility, the government must ensure the sustainability of raw materials, engage and listen to the concerns of local communities, reduce political interference in industrial management, and attract and retain competent technocrats and engineers.
As Dangote bulldozes through to establish such a huge edifice in the Bono Region, the taxpayers’ funds used to construct the Komenda factory must not be allowed to rot away; all must be done to revive the factory.
