In video that made rounds on social media some years back, a young boy expected to be between the ages of 8 and 12 was asked what profession envisages to become in future. This young boy gladly answered that he wants to become a ‘delegate.’ The boy, at that young age, may have witnessed the financial and material benefits associated with the delegates system in party politics in Ghana, hence his answer.
But it appears this delegate system has come to an end following the verdict of the apex court. The Supreme Court may have delivered a constitutional judgment. But it may also have disrupted one of Ghana’s most overlooked political industries.
For years, the delegate system was the engine behind internal party contests. It determined who voted in presidential and parliamentary primaries, but beyond its constitutional role, it also created an economic ecosystem that stretched far beyond party headquarters.
Every delegate conference created a marketplace. Hotels filled to capacity, transport operators moved delegates across the country, caterers prepared hundreds of meals, printing presses churned out campaign materials, media houses sold advertising, event organisers coordinated programmes and security providers found business. Around every internal party election, a temporary economy emerged, sustained by the political calendar.
But the deeper economy was not only about the logistics. It was about the economy of influence.
Because a relatively small group of delegates held the power to determine political fortunes, campaign resources naturally followed them. Candidates built networks around delegates, invested in mobilisation structures and focused their political spending where decisions were made.
It is a common sight to behold party delegates returning from party internal contest with items such as Television Sets, fridges, Irons, Motorbikes, knapsack sprayer, cloth, cutlass etc on top of fat envelopes with varying amounts of money. It even becomes a discussion among these delegates about who paid more or who delivered the most valuable items. For these privileged few, it is a ‘time of harvest’ or ‘cocoa season’ where they reap enormously.
For the appellants to the Supreme Court, this system where power is resided in a selected few, by virtue of their status of being a delegate, was undemocratic. It conflicted with the democratic principle of universal adult suffrage.
The Supreme Court’s decision has cured the undemocratic nature of the process and has also changed the dynamics of the influence economy or the delegates marketplace. If every party member in good standing must participate in internal elections, political campaigns can no longer be built around a select few. Candidates and parties will have to engage a much wider membership base, creating new opportunities for digital campaign platforms, voter management systems, political consultants, logistics providers and other players who support mass political mobilisation.
The money, however, does not disappear. It simply follows a new route. This raises a broader question about what some have described as Ghana’s growing political moneycracy, the idea that financial strength increasingly determines political success. Critics of the delegate system argued that concentrating voting power among a few people created an environment where money could have an outsized influence.
But removing delegates may not necessarily remove the influence of money. A larger electorate could mean a more expensive political contest. Reaching thousands of party members across constituencies and regions requires greater organisation, communication, transportation and campaign infrastructure. The cost of winning internal elections, even before a national elections, may therefore rise significantly.
Who pays for this new democracy?
Political parties will now have to develop systems capable of managing nationwide internal elections, including credible membership registers, voting arrangements, security and logistics. If those costs shift heavily onto aspirants, the reform, which is intended to broaden participation could unintentionally favour candidates with greater financial resources.
In that sense, political moneycracy may not disappear. It may simply change its form. The Supreme Court’s decision has undoubtedly opened a new chapter for Ghana’s internal party democracy. It gives ordinary party members a greater voice in choosing those who seek political office. But every institutional reform creates new incentives, and every new incentive creates new winners and losers.
The delegate economy may indeed be fading away. The bigger question is whether Ghana has also defeated political moneyocracy, or merely moved it from a smaller room of delegates into a much larger marketplace of voters.
