The demolition of numerous structures at Laboma may have improved the country’s flood mitigation measures, but on the other side of the spectrum is a huge investment and businesses brought on their knees.
The destruction has affirmed the long-standing, but troubling phenomenon in Ghana’s development-control system. The destruction begs the question: how did buildings and businesses worth potentially millions of cedis grow within a protected area before authorities finally brought in the bulldozers?
This latest exercise at the Kpeshie Lagoon enclave on Sunday, September 13, 2026, was carried out as part of efforts to restore the Kpeshie Lagoon and reduce flooding. The exercise conducted by the Ghana Armed Forces has affected restaurants, clubs and hospitality businesses, including the Pink Flamingo Lounge. The government says parts of the lagoon’s natural flood-retention area were reclaimed for development, reducing its ability to absorb stormwater.
In all these, the environmental case may be compelling. However, it does not erase the equally important question of how the encroachment was allowed to happen in the first place.
Structures Do Not Appear Overnight
A commercial facility, like the ones brought down during the exercise, does not emerge from nowhere. It takes months or years of land preparation, construction, furnishing and investment before a restaurant, nightclub or resort begins operating.
Ghana’s local assemblies and planning authorities have responsibilities for development control and are empowered to stop unauthorised construction. Yet by the time the bulldozers arrived at Laboma, the developments had become established businesses.
This raises the question of why enforcement was not decisive when the first foundation was being laid.
The Cost of Delayed Enforcement
Although the exact aggregate value of the demolished properties has not yet been publicly established, the scale of the destruction is clearly significant. These were not temporary structures. They represented years of private capital, equipment, business development and employment.
The Laboma Director has said businesses in the area supported more than 3,000 jobs. Every demolished building therefore represents more than bricks and concrete. It represents investment lost, businesses disrupted, jobs threatened and future income wiped out.
However, much of this loss could have been avoided.
Some Developers Cannot Escape Blame
It must be emphasized that the government’s failure to nip the developments in the bud, however, does not automatically make some of the developers innocent.
Some developers knowingly push beyond planning restrictions, ignore stop orders, or rely on political and personal connections to keep projects moving.
In Laboma’s case, the Greater Accra Regional Minister has said some developers were warned to stop construction but continued.
This has created a dangerous cycle in the country’s development control. An assembly objects to a development, but a developer calls someone influential. Then ‘order from above’ comes and construction continues. More money is invested, and the structure becomes a functioning business.
But years later, demolition becomes the only remaining option, destroying years of investment and toil.
Both Sides (Authorities & Developers) Create the Disaster
This is why the Laboma case should not be reduced to a simple government-versus-developer dispute. Authorities can be negligent, while developers can be determined to have their way at all costs.
Officials may fail to enforce planning rules early enough. Developers may exploit weak enforcement or political influence to keep building. By the time the state intervenes, millions of cedis may already have been sunk into projects that should never have reached completion.
The result is a lose-lose situation where the developer loses the investment, workers lose livelihoods, the community loses businesses, and the government must spend more money restoring the affected area.
A Case for Proactive Authorities & Responsible Developers
If Laboma was genuinely within a protected flood buffer zone, development should have been stopped at the beginning. As experts say, the essence of effective development control is to prevent the violation before it becomes a crisis.
The government must therefore investigate not only the demolished structures, but also the decisions and failures that allowed them to emerge.
Who approved the developments?
Who ignored the encroachment?
Who failed to enforce stop orders?
Did political or personal influence interfere with regulation?
Unless those questions are answered, Ghana risks repeating the same cycle elsewhere. A government that allows millions of cedis to be invested in an illegal development before demolishing it has failed at prevention.
And at the same time, a developer who knowingly builds where development is prohibited has also failed in responsibility. Laboma is therefore not merely a demolition story; it is a costly lesson in what happens when both regulation and compliance break down.
