When President John Dramani Mahama had his first media encounter on Wednesday, September, 10, 2025, he revealed that Ghana had activated an agreement with the United States to receive West African nationals deported or awaiting deportation. Fourteen such persons had already been received. In his briefing, the President offered no cap on how many more might follow but justified the decision by remarking that West Africans “don’t need a visa anyway” to come to Ghana.
That explanation raised eyebrows in the country. But the bigger storm broke abroad, and in a Washington courtroom. Judge Tanya Chutkan of the U.S. District Court openly rebuked the Trump administration for what she called a “very suspicious scheme.” Her concern was that migrants deported to Ghana, including Nigerians and Gambians, had standing court orders protecting them from removal to their home countries, where they feared persecution. Yet court filings revealed that once in Accra, they were told by U.S. and Ghanaian officials that they would be sent home anyway. One man, a bisexual Gambian, was reportedly returned within days to Banjul, where same-sex relations are criminalised.
The U.S. Justice Department admitted that such transfers would violate protective orders but insisted Washington could not control Ghana’s decisions. Judge Chutkan was unimpressed, describing the arrangement as an “end run” around America’s legal duties.
The Constitutional Questions
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana empowers the President to execute treaties, agreements, and conventions on behalf of the Republic. However, article 75 places a limitation, by requiring that such agreements must be ratified by Parliament, either by Act or by a resolution supported by more than half of all Members of Parliament.
Here, the scope of and the reasons for the Ghana–U.S. arrangement remains unclear. Yet President Mahama himself described it as an “agreement.” The Supreme Court, in Banful and Another v. Attorney-General, held that whenever the Government of Ghana, by any form of documentation, binds the Republic to obligations with another country, that amounts to an international agreement requiring parliamentary approval. If the deportation arrangement falls within that category, then ratification would be constitutionally necessary.
The ECOWAS Legal Framework
Beyond the Constitution lies the obligations of the Republic of Ghana on the international plane. Since 1979, West African states have bound themselves to protocols guaranteeing the free movement of persons, the right of residence, and the right of establishment.
- The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement affirms the right of Community citizens to enter the territory of any member state without a visa, subject only to a valid travel document and health certificate.
- The 1986 Supplementary Protocol extends that right to residence for employment purposes, while stressing that mass expulsion is prohibited. Individual expulsion is permitted, but only on limited grounds such as national security, public order, or public health.
In practice, this framework is legally binding on all ECOWAS states, including Ghana, Nigeria, and Gambia. Even without separate bilateral agreements, the Protocols serve as the governing law on cross-border movement and settlement among them.
But the free movement regime was never meant to transform one member state into a transit hub for deportations arranged by non-member countries. It was designed to allow voluntary migration within the region, not to justify the onward transfer of persons into danger zones.
Refugee Law and the “Non-Refoulement” Principle
The third layer is international refugee law. Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, reinforced by the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, enshrines the principle of non-refoulement. This principle prohibits returning anyone to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a social group.
The duty binds Ghana as a party to these instruments and operates independently of ECOWAS law. So in simple terms: ‘no matter the migration regime, individuals cannot be returned to persecution.’
Putting the Pieces Together
Taken together, the picture is complicated. Ghana admits deportees from the United States under an arrangement whose terms are not yet known. Some of those deportees have no direct connection to Ghana. As the proceedings in the U.S. District Court suggest, once in Accra, at least five were told they would be sent onward to Nigeria or Gambia, despite U.S. court orders protecting them. One was returned to Gambia almost immediately.
On the law, the issues converge. Constitutionally, if the deal between Ghana and the U.S. binds the Republic, Parliament’s ratification is required under Article 75, as the Banful case makes clear. Regionally, ECOWAS protocols allow free movement but were never meant to justify one state acting as a deportation proxy for another. Internationally, refugee law bars sending individuals to countries where they fear persecution.
Against this backdrop, Judge Chutkan’s warning resonates: the arrangement risks looking like a deliberate way for the U.S. to outsource deportations, using Ghana as a transit hub to achieve what it could not do directly. Whether Ghana’s actions amount to a breach of international law directly or indirectly, the perception remains troubling.
Conclusion
The government’s comments cast the arrangement as a routine application of ECOWAS free movement rules. But the facts on the ground, the constitutional requirements, and the international obligations suggest a far more complex legal picture. Until the scope of the Ghana–U.S. deal is clarified, and possibly tested against the requirements of Parliament’s ratification and refugee law, questions about its legality and propriety will remain.
