Not only is the royalty rate in Ghana’s Lithium Deal a major concern for analysts, but it is emerging that the agreements are a total affront to the country’s own Green Minerals Policy as far as value addition is concerned.
It will be recalled that the discovery of lithium, also called the “white gold,” in the country was hailed as a seminal opportunity for the nation to participate in the global transition toward renewable energy and electric mobility.
To position itself well and capitalize on this strategic shift, the government adopted a “Green Minerals Policy,” which promised to break from Ghana’s history of extractive governance and prohibit the export of raw ore.
However, a forensic review of the revised 2025 Ewoyaa Mining Lease conducted by IMANI Center for Policy and Education reveals that this promise of value addition is being systematically abandoned, reducing Ghana’s role to a mere supplier of raw material for foreign factories.
IMANI says the deal, though withdrawn from parliament, was poised to commit a “grave error of economic statecraft,” effectively turning the national Green Minerals Policy into nothing more than a “hallucination.
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The Illusion of Value Addition
The think tank says the true value of lithium lies in transforming the raw material, spodumene concentrate (SC6), into battery-grade chemicals like Lithium Hydroxide or Carbonate. The policy position document cited by The High Street Journal notes that one tonne of raw concentrate is worth roughly $1,000.
However, the refined battery, which is a grade chemical, is worth within the range of $15,000 to $20,000 per tonne.
Sadly, IMANI observes that despite this massive difference in value, the current 2025 draft agreement fails to ensure that the company is truly obligated to refine the material in Ghana.
From the government’s agreement with Atlantic Lithium, the commitment to establishing a chemical plant is heavily conditioned on “scoping studies” and economic viability assessments. IMANI says the clause as provided in the agreement offers what it describes as “ample escape hatches” for the operator.
The think tank explains that, in essence, the agreement only requires the foreign company to “find out whether lithium can be refined in Ghana,” instead of implementing a roadmap focused on what the country needs to achieve refinement.
Given the present weak policy context, such as high industrial electricity tariffs and a lack of domestic production of necessary reagents, it is highly probable that the company’s study will conclude that a refinery in Ghana is “uneconomic”.
Without strict incentives or penalties, this commitment to downstream processing is deemed legally unenforceable and essentially illusory.
Already, The High Street Journal is privy to information that suggests that the said scoping studies have been conducted, and the conclusion is that a refinery is not viable in the country. The justification is that just a mine [in this case, Ewoyaa Lithium Mine] is not just enough for the establishment of a lithium mine. The company says that for a lithium processing plant to be viable, three mines the size of Ewoyaa are needed.
Repeating the “Gold Curse”
The think tank argues that by prioritizing raw export, Ghana is repeating the historical mistakes of its gold sector, often referred to as the “Gold Curse”. For decades, Ghana, despite being a top gold producer, has captured only a small fraction of the value chain due to fiscal regimes that allowed raw export with minimal local linkage.
The current lithium deal, as captured in the revised agreement, suggests this trend is continuing, despite lithium’s strategic global importance, which should grant Ghana “significantly higher leverage” in negotiations.
This weak approach to industrialization stands in stark contrast to other resource-holding nations. IMANI cites Zimbabwe, for instance, which has taken a “bold sovereign stance” by banning raw ore exports to directly force refining investment within its borders.
On the other hand, Ghana, by comparison, is allowing the export of concentrate while merely “studying” the need for a refinery, a policy deemed weak.
Furthermore, IMANI dismisses the attempts by proponents of the deal to advertise the potential for local feldspar production, a low-value industrial mineral, as a classic diversionary tactic.
The think tank believes this idea is intended to distract the public from the major concessions made on the high-value lithium asset.
The Bottomline
To prevent the next 15 years from being characterized by merely shipping out raw concentrate, IMANI is urging Parliament to reject the current lease. The think tank is urging that the government ensures that the deal moves in sync with the country’s Green Minerals Policy.
They recommend that the “scoping study” loophole must be replaced with a binding commitment to establish a refinery within a set timeframe, potentially backed by performance bonds or punitive export taxes on raw concentrate if the goal is missed.
The failure to secure mandatory value addition means Ghana will likely continue to export strategic resources as simple rocks, forfeiting its chance to capture the exponential profit of the high-value battery supply chain.
The current 2025 Ewoyaa Mining Lease is seen as the ultimate test of Ghana’s resolve to truly break the cycle of extractive dependency.
