AirtelTigo—now rebranded as AT and fully owned by the state—is reportedly hemorrhaging GH₵20 million every month, with total debts surpassing $200 million.
These alarming figures have reignited debate among industry watchers and policymakers about the viability and sustainability of the telecom operator. Leading the charge is Derek B. Laryea, a respected technology entrepreneur and public policy consultant, who offered an unfiltered analysis of the situation in a recent interview with The High Street Journal.
Communications Minister Samuel Nartey George has already made headlines with his blunt assessment of AT’s condition, describing the 2020 state acquisition priced at a symbolic $1 as “reckless.” His frustration stems from years of poor financial performance, obsolete technological infrastructure, and an overall inability to compete effectively in Ghana’s highly competitive telecom sector, dominated by players like MTN.
Laryea, echoing similar concerns, pointed to a “complex mix of factors” behind AT’s dismal state.
“This isn’t just a matter of bad accounting. We’re dealing with management inefficiencies, poor post-merger strategy, underinvestment in infrastructure, and market imbalance,” he explained.
He highlighted the dominance of MTN in 4G and mobile money as significant external pressure points that continue to stifle AT’s market relevance.
But the big question remains: what should Ghana do with AT?
Laryea believes the country must decide what strategic value it places on owning a national telco asset. “There’s always a case for keeping a telco under state control for national security and digital sovereignty,” he acknowledged. “But we may have exhausted all the tools management reshuffles, rebranding, and service repackaging with little to show in terms of results.”
With the state struggling to turn AT into a viable, self-sustaining business, Laryea suggests a pragmatic pivot: the involvement of private capital.
“If the government cannot halt the losses and avoid passing that burden onto taxpayers, then a strategic partnership or even partial sale to a capable investor might be necessary,” he said.
Such a move, he argued, must be driven by more than desperation. It must be structured around a clear turnaround strategy with accountability and capital injection at its core. He floated the idea of a public-private partnership (PPP), though he was quick to caution that “even a PPP may not attract the level of investment needed unless there’s a compelling long-term vision.”
The government, for its part, has announced plans to enter into debt resolution talks and is developing a new policy aimed at stabilizing operations, protecting jobs, and perhaps revitalizing the asset. However, time may not be on AT’s side, as sustained losses risk eroding what little goodwill and operational viability remain.
The broader issue, Laryea noted, is not just about rescuing AT but about rethinking the role of state-owned enterprises in competitive sectors. “We need to ask ourselves whether the state should be a player or a referee in industries like telecoms,” he concluded.
Whether through strategic divestiture, recapitalization, or full restructuring, the fate of AirtelTigo could become a litmus test for Ghana’s approach to public sector reform and digital transformation. One thing is clear: the status quo is no longer sustainable.
