The High Court in Accra set aside a defamation action filed by the Majority Leader in Parliament, Osahen Alexander Afenyo-Markin, against Samuel Adu Gyamfi and Multimedia Group Ltd, ON 14th October, 2026, ruling that the failure to endorse the writ of summons with particulars of the alleged defamatory publication rendered the action incurably defective and incompetent.
In a ruling delivered on October 14, 2026, Justice Kwasi Adjenim-Boateng held that the requirements governing libel actions under Order 57 Rule 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) had not been complied with.
The decision turned on a procedural question of whether particulars of an alleged defamatory publication set out in a statement of claim could cure the failure to endorse those particulars on the writ of summons itself.
The court answered that question in the negative, distinguishing the circumstances of the case from an earlier Supreme Court decision on which Afenyo-Markin had relied.
The dispute behind the application
Afenyo-Markin instituted the action following a publication he considered defamatory. His claims included general, aggravated and exemplary damages, an unconditional retraction and public apology, publication of the retraction and apology with substantially the same prominence as the original material, and a perpetual injunction against further publication of the alleged defamatory statements.
He also sought costs of GH¢15 million as compensation.
On August 31, 2026, the first defendant, Samuel Adu Gyamfi, entered a conditional appearance and filed an application asking the court to set aside the writ of summons and accompanying statement of claim and dismiss the action.
The application was based on the contention that the writ had not been endorsed with sufficient particulars of the publication complained of, as required by Order 57 Rule 2 of C.I. 47.
The defendant argued that the omission was not a mere procedural irregularity but a defect affecting the competence of the action and the court’s jurisdiction to entertain it.
What the law requires
Order 57 Rule 2 of C.I. 47 provides that before a writ is issued in an action for libel, it must be endorsed with a statement giving sufficient particulars of the publication complained of to enable it to be identified.
The provision establishes a specific procedural requirement for libel claims. It requires the claimant to identify the publication forming the basis of the action on the writ, rather than leaving the necessary particulars to be supplied only in another accompanying document.
The dispute was therefore not simply whether the alleged defamatory publication had been described somewhere in Afenyo-Markin’s court documents. It was whether the particulars had been endorsed in the manner prescribed by the rule.
Why the Statement of Claim did not save the action
Afenyo-Markin opposed the application, arguing that the writ and statement of claim should be read together.
His legal team relied on Order 82 Rule 3 of C.I. 47, which interprets a writ of summons and its endorsement to include the accompanying statement of claim. They maintained that the statement of claim contained sufficient particulars of the publication, particularly in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 22 and 23.
The plaintiff also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Owusu Domena v. Amoah [2015–2016] 1 SCGIR 790, arguing that particulars contained in a statement of claim could cure a defect in the endorsement on a writ.
However, Justice Adjenim-Boateng held that the circumstances of Owusu Domena v. Amoah were materially different.
In that earlier case, the Supreme Court considered the effect of a failure to comply with the endorsement requirement where the defendant had not objected to the defect and had participated fully in the proceedings. The Court explained that Order 81 of C.I. 47 had taken care of the non-compliance in those circumstances, allowing the particulars in the statement of claim to be treated as curing the defect.
In Afenyo-Markin’s case, the judge emphasised that the first defendant had entered a conditional appearance and immediately followed it with an application challenging the competence of the action.
This was the decisive distinction for the trial judge. The defendant had raised the objection at the outset rather than proceeding with the litigation without complaint.
Consequently, the court declined to apply the reasoning in Owusu Domena v. Amoah to excuse the omission.
Why the specific rules for libel actions mattered
The court further reasoned that specific legal remedies must be pursued in accordance with the particular procedural rules governing them.
Justice Adjenim-Boateng pointed to other specialised procedures under C.I. 47, including those governing commercial claims, moneylenders’ and mortgage actions, insolvency proceedings, debenture-holder actions and maritime actions.
In the court’s view, the general provisions of the rules could not simply be relied upon to overcome a failure to comply with a specific requirement applicable to a defamation action.
The judge reinforced this position by relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in the consolidated cases of Alex Onumah Coleman & Anor v. Newmont Ghana Gold, Emmanuel Atsiafu & Ors v. Newmont Ghana Gold and Isaac Kongetey & Anor v. Newmont Ghana Gold ([2021] 171 GMJ 261).
The Supreme Court had emphasised the requirement under Order 57 Rule 2 that a writ in a libel action contain sufficient particulars of the publication complained of to enable it to be identified.
It also referred to Order 57 Rule 3(1), which requires a plaintiff alleging that words were used in a defamatory sense other than their ordinary meaning to provide particulars of the facts and matters relied upon to support that meaning.
Relying on these authorities, the High Court concluded that the failure to endorse the particulars of the alleged defamatory publication on the writ rendered the action incurably defective and incompetent.
Why the amended writ did not change the outcome
Another important aspect of the ruling was the plaintiff’s attempt to amend his court processes after the objection had been filed.
On September 1, 2026, Afenyo-Markin filed an amended writ of summons and amended statement of claim, which included a claim for a declaration that the description of him as an “extortionist” in a NewsFile broadcast on August 22, 2026, was defamatory and actuated by malice.
The court, however, declined to consider the amended processes in determining the pending application.
Justice Adjenim-Boateng relied on Ahinakwah II & Anor v. Okaidja III & Ors [2010–12] 2 GLR 452, where the court stated that an amendment cannot be sought or granted for the purpose of defeating an objection to a process already pending before the court.
The judge therefore confined his determination to the competence of the original writ and statement of claim filed on August 24, 2026.
The court’s decision
Having found that the plaintiff had failed to comply with Order 57 Rule 2 of C.I. 47, the High Court set aside the writ of summons and statement of claim filed on August 24, 2026, on the ground that the action was incurably defective and incompetent.
The ruling was confined to the procedural competence of the action. It did not determine whether the publication complained of was, in fact, defamatory or whether the defendants were liable for defamation.
Although counsel for the first defendant requested GH¢20,000 in costs, the court made no order as to costs.
