Amid the recent developments over the government’s latest decision concerning Springfield’s block, a new brief by policy think tank IMANI Africa suggests a more viable and smarter option for the state rather than the intended outright buyout.
IMANI says purchasing the block outright is not only risky but could expose the state to shadowy lobbying, inflated valuations, and a political minefield.
This new development comes following fresh concerns that the government may be considering a full takeover of Springfield’s Afina oil discovery.
For the policy think tank, the Afina block, they argue, is far from the oil jackpot it is sometimes portrayed to be, based on the current exploration data.
In its latest brief titled “Springfield’s Latest Dance with the Government of Ghana,” the think tank maintained that at its core, Afina is a one-well discovery with a patchy testing history, long-delayed appraisal, and no regulator-certified reserve estimate.
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Moreover, it adds that there is no independently verified data confirming the billions of barrels Springfield once claimed. In fact, conflicting assessments from ENI, GNPC, and external analysts point to one conclusion: nobody really knows what sits in that block; it could be valuable, or it could be completely worthless.
For a well with such a patchy potential, IMANI believes buying the block outright would be a dangerous leap in the dark.
Instead of the outright purchase, the think tank argues for a cleaner and smarter alternative. This option, it is believed, protects the state’s purse, avoids political landmines, and still gives Ghana strategic control if Afina proves commercially viable.
IMANI says since Ghana already owns a stake in the block through Explorco and GNPC, instead of purchasing Afina at an uncertain and likely inflated valuation, the state could lend funds to the joint venture to support further appraisal work.
To put it simply, think of this option as giving the project a chance to prove itself, but with strings attached.
This proposed loan would be convertible, meaning Ghana has the exclusive right to transform that loan into a bigger ownership share later, even up to majority control if the evidence supports it. With this option, IMANI believes that if Afina turns out to be a strong commercial field, Ghana wins. If not, the state avoids throwing good money away.
“Ghana owns stakes already in Afina through Explorco and GNPC. It can choose to lend funds to the implicit joint venture to de-risk the Afina prospect through additional appraisal, including by drilling another well to improve commercial confidence,” IMANI noted.
It added, “This loan can be structured as a convertible with Ghana owning the exclusive option to convert the loan to additional equity in the block. The option could have step-up provisions towards granting Ghana a controlling stake if necessary.”
IMANI notes that such an arrangement would put pressure on Springfield to bring in credible partners who can co-finance development. If Springfield cannot secure additional commercial investors, that alone becomes a loud warning that the block may not be commercially attractive after all.
The think tank argues that this is the ultimate test.
By refusing to buy the block outright, especially without transparent, regulator-approved data, Ghana protects itself from backroom deals, mispriced assets, and political backlash. IMANI argues that a convertible loan forces real technical due diligence; one that ensures decisions are guided by evidence, not excitement or influence.
“The beauty of such an arrangement is that Springfield would then need to bring on board new farm-in partners to avoid being diluted to marginal minority status. At any rate, if Springfield is incapable of bringing on board additional commercial partners, then it would mean that the block is not commercially viable, a critical assay for any spending by Ghana,” it added.
IMANI joins other CSOs, such as ACEP, that believe that for a country navigating tight fiscal pressures, there is no need to rush into ownership of an oil field with questionable prospects.
They are therefore championing the call for the government to hasten slowly before it lands itself in another bad debt after purchasing a “worthless” oil field.
