…Trotros Will Become Real Business
By Gideon Sackitey
Accra’s transportation problem is often misdiagnosed and described as broken. Truthfully, it was never intended to be a system. What exists today is a loose collection of privately operated vehicles competing for survival in the public space.
Each year, we see new buses, new terminals, and sometimes new reforms. However, congestion on our roads has worsened. Alongside this has been an increased spate of accidents, and in that terrible category has been the load of long-suffering commuters who usually spend as much as 2 hours to get a bus to their destinations.
At the heart of all this is a chaotic business model that rewards disorder.
The congestions indiscipline, unsafe and uncomfortable vehicles, unpredictable travel times, pollution, and lost productivity we see are not accidents. These are the logical outcomes of a city that has grown without a coherent mobility strategy or philosophy. Accra moves people, yes. However, it does not transport them with the same dignity and predictability that similar cities like Côte d’Ivoire and London do.
The truth is uncomfortable but clear: Accra needs a TRANSPORT AUTHORITY.
This feature explains, in practical terms, how a city like Accra can transition from its current chaos to a fully ordered, scheduled and financially sustainable public transportation system through the establishment of the Accra Transport Authority (ATA) riding on the back of an Act of Parliament. The ATA is based on the Transport for London (TfL) model and can be derived from Article 240 of the 1992 Constitution, Section 35 (6)(d), and the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936).
An Accra Transport Authority would be the key umbrella body, integrating modes, fixed routes and schedules, dedicated infrastructure, and reducing reliance on the informal system and operators. Currently, Accra’s transport responsibilities are fragmented across Ministries, assemblies, the police, Unions, and political actors.
With an Authority, not a Committee, there will be real power to execute the vital tasks that make a city functional. There is nothing wrong with adopting what happens in London, considered one of the most efficient transport systems in the world. An ATA will not drive buses, sell tickets or compete with private operators. Instead, the Authority plans, organises, funds, enters into contracts and regulates pubic urban transport as one coordinated system, as you will find TfL do for London.
The Authority, in short, will design routes (some that exist already), pay for its operation and together with the Ghana Police or its own security and local Assemblies, enforce standards, while private companies run the buses under contract. It would end the guesswork. Routes will be designed around where people live, work, study, and trade, not where unions claim space.
Accra’s “System” is Chaotic
The defining feature of Accra’s transport chaos is not indiscipline; it is incentives. Drivers earn only when they carry passengers. Vehicle owners earn only when vehicles are full. Unions, whose survival depends on passenger volume, not service quality, control terminals. In such a system, disorder is a rational behaviour.
The result is predictable – waiting to fill, racing other buses, indiscriminate stopping, and refusal to operate during low-demand hours. As I said earlier, this system cannot meet the demands of a modern city like Accra. These are the logical outcomes of a passenger-driven revenue model in an unregulated environment. No amount of enforcement can permanently address this issue, because enforcement addresses behaviour without changing the underlying incentives or attractions. Order begins only when the incentive structure changes and we embrace effective transport governance, finance, and discipline, the very pillars on which Transport for London (TfL) is built and the same structure can be adopted for the proposed ATA.
Waiting to fill, racing other buses, blocking intersections, refusing to operate at night, and overloading vehicles are not moral failures. They are the fruits of a passenger-driven revenue model in an unregulated environment. A façade of seeming order.
Order begins only when the incentive structure changes.
The TfL Breakthrough
Transport for London solved this problem by separating three things that are dangerously mixed in Accra:
• Service planning (routes, frequency, timetables)
• Revenue collection (fares)
• Service delivery (driving buses)
Under TfL, private companies do not compete for passengers. They compete for contracts. Their income does not depend on how many people board a bus (note, I said bus not mini-bus) but on how well they deliver the service specified by the public Transport Authority. This separation is the foundation of order.
How Order Is Paid For
The most misunderstood aspect of the TfL model is funding. Many assume London’s system works because it is rich especially since it operates in an advanced economy. May be so. But that system works because money flows in a disciplined, predictable way.
Centralized Fare Collection
In a TfL system, all passenger fares is paid to the transport authority, not to drivers or operators. Whether through cards, mobile apps, or tickets, revenue flows into a single pool controlled by the authority.
For Accra, this means:
• No cash competition on buses
• No on the spot fare negotiations
• Transparent accounting of passenger revenue and, above all
• No collection/stealing of fares by driver-mates.
This pooled revenue becomes the backbone of system funding.
The second option is Contracted Payments to Operators
Since the buses belong to individuals in the company, individual operators are paid a fixed rate per kilometer operated (covered), based on their contracts, as competitively awarded. The contract specifies the following:
• Routes
• Frequency
• Operating hours
• Performance standards
• Payments are thus predictable and enforceable. A bus that runs its scheduled kilometres ultimately is paid. One that does not receive anything.
This immediately eliminates waiting to fill, route abandonment, selective trips, short-short and non availability of buses.
In the London system, research has shown that fares alone do not pay for the entire system. Public subsidy fills the gap not to save failing operators, but to guarantee socially necessary services.
For Accra, the subsidy would be targeted, transparent and linked to kilometers and service levels. These include some subsidy for early morning services, night routes, student corridors, and low-income areas, which are paid for deliberately and not left to chance.
Transport experts would agree with me that a modern transport Authority earns beyond fares. They rake in revenue from advertising on buses and shelters, naming rights for stations and routes and road user charges, such as charges for vehicles that take up the dedicated bus routes.
These revenues reduce pressure on fares and improve financial resilience, which would take away the frequent fare adjustments.
The Change We Must Adopt
With the ATA under a reformed system, operators would be paid for the distance they operate, not the number of passengers they chase. Whether a bus is full or empty, the operator earns a fixed rate per kilometre. Fare revenue is collected by the city authorities, not the driver and his conductor/mate. This single change eliminates reckless driving, waiting to fill, and route abandonment.
It turns transport into a service, not a street gamble.
An expectation in the reformed system is the creation of arterial roads operated by contracted operators only. An example of an arterial road is the Adenta-Tetteh Quarshie-Airport-37-King Tackie Tawiah Overhead to Accra Central and Kwame Nkrumah Interchange (Circle) Area. This route would not have Trotros on them. They (trotro) would be feeding this artery from designated points in the inner cities, as agreed by the ATA.
Transforming Trotros into Businesses
Contrary to the fears of many, especially owners of Trotros, the GPRTU, and the Cooperative Transport Union, this reform would not kill their industry. In my estimation, it rescues it, gives it more life and sustainability.
Current trotro operators are trapped in a daily cash struggle, have no access to bank finance, no fleet renewal policy, no insurance discipline and serious accident exposure. However, under the ATA, operators form cooperatives or limited liability companies and bid competitively for routes that they would operate between 5 to 7-years renewable period.
Thus, income becomes predictable and bankable, where banks would be agree to finance their fleet of buses because cash flow is guaranteed by government-backed contracts. Drivers become salaried professionals, not commission hunters.
In this reform, commuters are prioritized. They gain reliability and predictability while the operator gains stability and the city gains order. Overall, the economy becomes more productive.
