An independent assessment of GoldBod’s 2025 financials suggests that calling the state institution a loss-making entity may be misleading and too quick to judge.
However, the wider gold-purchasing programme has recorded substantial losses on the Bank of Ghana’s balance sheet.
From his analysis of the claims and the financials of the entities involved, chartered accounting professional Dickson Assan says the debate over whether the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) is a loss-making entity needs to be separated from the losses recorded by the Bank of Ghana (BoG) under the country’s gold-for-reserves programme.
After reviewing GoldBod’s 2025 Annual Report, the BoG’s 2025 Annual Report and the IMF’s December 2025 Fifth Review under Ghana’s Extended Credit Facility programme, Dickson Assan indicated that GoldBod’s own financial statements do not show it as a loss-making entity in 2025.
The GH¢5.44Billion GoldBod Surplus in 2025
The accountant indicates that GoldBod reported total revenue of GH¢5.55 billion in 2025, against total expenditure of just GH¢109.6 million, resulting in a reported surplus of about GH¢5.44 billion. It is worthy of note that a major part of that revenue, however, was a GH¢4.55 billion government grant.
Assan explains that recognising the grant as revenue is consistent with IPSAS 23, which governs revenue from non-exchange transactions. But he argues that the more meaningful measure of GoldBod’s underlying performance is what happens when the one-off government injection is removed.
On that basis, GoldBod would still have recorded a surplus of approximately GH¢896.3 million. That compares with a restated GH¢178.48 million surplus recorded by the former Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC) in 2024, representing an increase of roughly 402%.
However, he cautions that the GH¢4.55 billion should not be treated as normal recurring income. GoldBod itself described the money as a revolving trade-capital subvention for gold purchasing and trading. Because it is essentially a capital injection, he argues that the GH¢896.3 million ex-grant surplus provides a better basis for assessing GoldBod’s actual operating performance.
The ‘Lower’ Expenditure
GoldBod’s total expenditure fell from GH¢129.7 million in 2024 to GH¢109.6 million in 2025, a decline of about 15.5%.
But Dickson Assan was quick to add that the figure can create the wrong impression. The entire decline was effectively explained by the absence of finance costs in 2025. PMMC recorded finance costs of GH¢46.04 million in 2024. Once that cost is stripped out, the underlying operating expenses actually increased from GH¢83.6 million to GH¢109.6 million, representing an increase of about 31%.
However, he does not consider this increase alarming. GoldBod significantly expanded its operations during the year, with employee numbers rising from 114 to 450, almost four times the previous workforce.
The accountant’s conclusion is therefore that while the 15.5% reduction in total expenditure is technically correct, it does not provide a complete picture of GoldBod’s underlying cost performance.
Where the Loss-Making Argument Comes From
This is where the distinction between GoldBod and the Bank of Ghana becomes critical. According to Dickson Assan, GoldBod does not itself carry the gold-for-reserves (G4R) trading position on its balance sheet. Rather, it acts as the Bank of Ghana’s buying agent for artisanal and small-scale gold.
The actual trading position and associated risks sit with the central bank. He agrees that the BoG did record substantial losses. Its 2025 accounts show a GH¢9.05 billion net loss on gold deals, covering the G4R and G4O programmes, compared with GH¢5.66 billion in 2024.
Of the 2025 loss, approximately GH¢8.85 billion related specifically to the G4R programme. The issue, he says, was also acknowledged by the IMF. In its December 2025 review, the IMF reported losses of about US$214 million on the artisanal and small-scale gold component of G4R through the third quarter of 2025.
The Fund argued that these losses should not ultimately be borne by the central bank and should instead be transparently brought onto the government’s budget.
However, the chartered accountant indicated that there is another side to the BoG numbers. Even the BoG’s gold-related position cannot simply be described as a massive loss without considering the other side of the transaction. The central bank recorded a GH¢9.57 billion gain from the sale of refined and bullion gold in 2025.
When that gain is considered alongside the GH¢9.05 billion net loss on gold deals, the overall gold-related position was close to break-even. This is why he says the numbers require more careful interpretation than simply declaring either GoldBod or the entire gold programme a loss-making venture.
GoldBod is Not Entirely Detached from the Losses
Importantly, Dickson Assan does not argue that GoldBod has absolutely nothing to do with the losses. GoldBod operates within the architecture of the gold-purchasing programme, and some costs can arise from the fees and arrangements through which gold is purchased and supplied.
The IMF itself has pointed to trading losses and costs associated with the artisanal and small-scale gold transactions. The crucial distinction, however, is where those losses are recognised in the accounts.
The losses in question are recorded in the Bank of Ghana’s financial statements, not GoldBod’s statement of financial performance.
Therefore, using the BoG’s G4R losses as direct evidence that GoldBod itself is a loss-making entity would, in the accountant’s assessment, be technically incorrect.
The Final Verdict
The conclusion of the accounting professional is rather more cautious. He explains that GoldBod only became operational in April 2025, with its Board inaugurated in May 2025. Its 2025 accounts therefore cover only part of its first year of operations and contain transitional figures inherited from PMMC.
This, he says, makes 2025 an imperfect year for judging the institution’s long-term efficiency, sustainability and value to the Ghanaian taxpayer. His assessment is therefore neither an unqualified defence of GoldBod nor an endorsement of the loss-making narrative.
For now, GoldBod’s own 2025 accounts show a surplus, not a loss. But substantial losses have been recorded by the Bank of Ghana in connection with the wider gold-for-reserves programme. Whether those losses ultimately constitute a cost to the Ghanaian taxpayer cannot be determined simply by looking at GoldBod’s accounts alone.
The real test, he argues, will come with GoldBod’s first full financial year in 2026.
