Despite Ghana’s heavy reliance on tomato imports from Burkina Faso, IMANI Africa says the country already has its antidote in the Agricultural for Economic Transformation Agenda (AETA).
This follows the recent terror attack on Ghanaian tomato traders in Burkina Faso. IMANI Africa says the heavy dependency on Burkina Faso for tomatoes is a clear indication of persistent structural challenges in the country’s tomato production.
In its lates analysis, IMANI Africa insists the solution is neither panic nor policy reinvention.
Instead, the think tank argues that three to five years of disciplined and sustained implementation of the AETA could significantly reduce Ghana’s tomato import dependence.
“If AETA maintains implementation momentum over the next three to five years, the current dependence may gradually decline,” the analysis of IMANI noted.
Policy Diagnosis Is Not the Problem
The 2024 Budget formally launched AETA, placing agricultural commercialization and import substitution at the heart of Ghana’s growth strategy.
Under it, IMANI recalls, is the Vegetable Development Project, “Yɛredua,” targeted at tomatoes, onions, and peppers.
According to IMANI, the policy has correctly diagnosed the core problem. It identifies irrigation expansion, value-chain development, post-harvest management, and commercialization as key priorities.
However, the challenge has been depth of execution.
For IMANI, structural transformation does not move at the speed of political cycles. Reducing imports will not happen simply because it has been declared. It will happen only when the underlying production and distribution systems change.
What Must Change on the Ground
IMANI outlines a practical roadmap for reducing dependence. This road, it says, is devoid of political rhetoric.
First, irrigated production zones in northern Ghana must operate year-round. Currently, much of Ghana’s tomato farming remains rain-fed, creating seasonal shortages that Burkina Faso fills. Expanding irrigation would smooth output and reduce the seasonal gap.
Moreover, the think tank says, aggregation centres must be strengthened to reduce post-harvest losses. Too much produce is lost between farm and market due to poor storage and handling.
In addition, processing plants must absorb peak-season surpluses. When farmers produce in abundance, excess tomatoes often rot because there is limited processing capacity. Functional processing facilities would stabilize supply and incomes.
The think tank further adds that logistics systems must efficiently move produce from farm gate to urban markets like Accra and Kumasi. Delays, poor roads and fragmented distribution raise costs and reduce competitiveness.
Finally, farmers must be integrated into predictable pricing frameworks. Without pricing certainty, market disputes and gluts discourage production planning.
A Three-to-Five-Year Window
IMANI believes that if AETA maintains strict implementation of the roadmap over the next three to five years, the country could begin to see measurable reductions in tomato imports.
The payoff could be significant as there will be reduced foreign exchange pressure, improved farmer incomes, stronger rural economies, and greater food security resilience.
The recent attacks serve as a reminder of Ghana’s exposure to external supply disruptions. However, IMANI cautions against interpreting the situation as evidence of policy failure.
IMANI is confident that if implementation stalls, the seasonal cycle will continue and Burkina Faso will remain embedded in Ghana’s food supply chain. However, if execution is consistent and disciplined, dependence could gradually decline.
