There’s a striking pattern emerging from Ghana’s domestic gold purchasing strategy, while one institution is thriving with profits, another is quietly absorbing a huge cost of the programme.
On one side is the newly created Ghana Gold Board (Goldbod), posting what can only be described as a breakout year. Its 2025 audited financials show revenue surging from GH¢307.7 million in 2024 to GH¢970.8 million in 2025, nearly tripling in just twelve months.
Even more remarkable is the operational (non-tax) surplus of GH¢909.7 million it recorded in the same year.
However, the situation is not all rosy on the other side. The Bank of Ghana (BoG) is reporting a GH¢19 billion loss for the same year, with the gold strategy accounting for a whopping GH¢9 billion of the total loss for 2025.
At first glance, the divergence raises eyebrows. How can two institutions, both central to Ghana’s gold ecosystem, move in such opposite financial directions?
The answer lies in the mechanisms and the burden of the Domestic Gold Purchasing Programme (DGPP).
Same Programme, Different Balance Sheets
Goldbod operates as a commercial-facing entity. It buys, aggregates, and channels gold, benefiting directly from margins, efficiencies, and scale. Its numbers reflect higher volumes, tighter cost control, and growing operational strength.
BoG, however, plays an entirely different role. It is the ultimate buyer of last resort. It is the institution that finances the system, absorbs risks, and converts gold into reserves that support the cedi and broader macroeconomic stability.
As the experts explain the distinction, while Goldbod books revenue and surplus, BoG books the cost of making the entire system work.
The GH¢9 Billion Question
A major chunk of BoG’s 2025 loss, about GH¢9 billion, is tied directly to the gold purchase programme.
It must be clarified that the GH¢9 billion is not money that has “vanished.” It represents the accounting cost of accumulating roughly 111 tonnes of gold. The asset sits on BoG’s balance sheet as reserves.
The country is richer in gold, but the central bank bears the financial strain of acquiring it. In simple terms, Goldbod earns from the pipeline, but BoG pays to fill the pipeline.
Profit vs. Policy Burden
What makes the contrast compelling and contentious is the uneven distribution of gains and costs. Goldbod’s model rewards efficiency and scale. It captures the upside of Ghana’s gold trade transformation.
BoG’s mandate, however, forces it to internalise the downside by financing purchases, managing liquidity, and absorbing valuation and interest costs.
It is, effectively, the shock absorber of the system.
A Structural Imbalance?
Should one institution profit while another shoulders the systemic cost of the same programme? In many ways, what is playing out is a classic case of quasi-fiscal burden, where a central bank takes on roles that go beyond traditional monetary policy, often at the expense of its own financial position.
None of this diminishes Goldbod’s achievement. It’s 2025 performance signals that Ghana’s gold aggregation strategy can work efficiently and profitably.
But it also highlights an uncomfortable truth that the success of the system is being subsidised, quietly, by the central bank.
