Ghana’s push to operationalise a 24-Hour Economy is exposing deeper questions about the country’s external partnerships, particularly with Germany.
In a research paper published by the Africa Policy Research Institute, policy analyst Bright Simons argues that the long-standing Ghana–Germany relationship has become overly concentrated on skills diffusion and SME support, leaving it misaligned with the industrial coordination demands of the 24HE agenda.
According to the paper, while TVET and SME support remain important, they are insufficient to deliver the type of coordinated industrial transformation envisioned under the 24HE policy.
From Platform-First to Spearhead-First
At the centre of Simons’ argument is a contrast between two pathways to industrialisation.
The first, which he describes as “platform-first,” emphasises broad capability diffusion, strengthening institutions, spreading skills and upgrading systems before major sector breakthroughs occur. This approach, he notes, characterised the post-war industrial trajectories of countries such as Japan, Italy and Ireland.
The second pathway, which he terms “spearhead-first” or vanguardist industrialisation, prioritises selective, export-driven sectors, building tightly integrated value chains before diffusing capabilities more broadly. Simons points to the experiences of South Korea, Taiwan, China and Vietnam as examples of this approach.
Ghana’s structural constraints, including a weak research and development base, fragmented training systems, low domestic capital accumulation and limited industrial clustering, make the platform-first model unrealistic in the near term, the paper argues.
Instead, the 24-Hour Economy requires what Simons describes as an “industrial-wedge” logic: building deep, corridor-based value chains in a few strategic sectors, anchoring exports, and then scaling outward.
Misalignment with the 24-Hour Economy
The 24HE initiative, which aims to reorganise production, logistics and labour systems to enable round-the-clock economic activity, is framed in the paper not as a labour-shift policy but as an industrial coordination doctrine.
Its pillars, including value-chain acceleration zones, 24/7 production corridors, digital orchestration and sectoral clustering, demand cross-sectoral investments that extend beyond classroom training.
Simons argues that Germany’s comparative strengths in logistics, industrial organisation, supply-chain governance, export embedding and blended finance are currently underutilised in Ghana. A continued focus on skills diffusion, without integration into production contracts and export corridors, risks perpetuating weak employment absorption.
“Germany may not be able to upskill Ghana into a 24-hour economy,” the paper suggests, “but it can become a central partner in industrial transformation if it reorients its engagement.”
A Proposed Industrial Compact
To address the mismatch, the brief proposes the creation of a Ghana–Germany Value Chain & Employment Compact for 2025–2028.
Such a framework would replace fragmented project-based cooperation with a more coordinated industrial partnership built around:
- Joint value-chain diagnostics
- Sector-based training linked to production contracts
- Blended finance structures for youth-led enterprises
- Integration into African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) regional markets
- Institutional exchange based on “equal interest” partnership rather than donor-recipient logic
The proposal aligns, Simons argues, with Germany’s evolving geoeconomic posture in the Global South, which increasingly emphasises industrial competitiveness and strategic positioning rather than traditional aid models.
A Strategic Choice
The paper concludes that Ghana and Germany face a clear choice.
They can continue with a TVET-centred, incremental cooperation model with limited industrial impact. Or they can pivot toward a vanguardist industrial partnership anchored in selective sectors, export corridors and coordinated value-chain acceleration.
For Germany, the question is whether its engagement in Ghana remains developmental assistance or evolves into industrial diplomacy.
