Finance Minister Cassiel Ato Forson wants Ghana’s 17th IMF bailout to be its last. The more difficult question is whether the fiscal discipline that has accompanied the programme can survive after the programme itself is gone.
“Seventeen IMF Bailout Programmes are enough,” Ato Forson said. “We are restoring discipline, rebuilding resilience, and creating an economy that can stand on its own. The seventeenth Bailout must be Ghana’s last.”
Ato Forson has repeatedly made the case that Ghana should break from its cycle of returning to the IMF whenever fiscal pressures, debt, and external financing constraints become difficult to manage.
What is significant now is that the IMF itself has identified the reforms that could determine whether that ambition holds.
In its latest assessment of Ghana, the Fund said the country has made substantial stabilisation gains under the current programme, with its risk of external and overall debt distress upgraded to moderate, two years earlier than expected at programme approval.
The improvement has also created what the IMF describes as “carefully calibrated fiscal space”. Ghana could lower its primary surplus target to 0.5% of GDP from 2027 and still preserve the 45% debt-to-GDP anchor for 2034.
But the Fund did not present this as permission to loosen fiscal policy generally. It tied the additional space to further progress in domestic revenue mobilisation, public financial management, investment management, and oversight of state-owned enterprises, particularly in the energy and cocoa sectors.
The country has repeatedly demonstrated that it can stabilise its finances under an IMF programme. The more persistent problem has been maintaining that discipline once the immediate programme constraints disappear.
The IMF’s own history of Ghana’s programmes provides evidence of that pattern. Its 2025 review found that fiscal performance deteriorated sharply at the end of 2024, with election-related spending contributing to a large accumulation of unpaid bills. Corrective measures were subsequently introduced.
Earlier IMF assessments have also documented repeated fiscal slippages, with expenditure overruns and weaknesses in fiscal institutions contributing to pressure on debt and inflation.
That is why the IMF’s latest recommendation matters more than simply another endorsement of Ghana’s economic recovery.
Domestic revenue mobilisation sits at the centre of the issue. A country that wants to remain outside repeated IMF financing programmes needs enough reliable domestic revenue to finance public services and investment without repeatedly resorting to borrowing.
The IMF has previously identified weaknesses in Ghana’s tax administration and pointed to the need to close gaps in VAT compliance through stronger enforcement, risk management, and digitalisation.
Public financial management is equally important. Ghana’s latest crisis demonstrated that an approved budget does not necessarily prevent the accumulation of obligations outside effective spending controls.
The government has therefore amended the Public Financial Management Act, introducing a statutory primary-surplus requirement and a 45% debt anchor, while establishing an independent Fiscal Council.
Those rules are intended to make fiscal discipline less dependent on an IMF programme and more embedded in Ghana’s own institutions.
That is also where Ato Forson’s argument meets the IMF’s recommendation. His stated objective of “restoring discipline” and “rebuilding resilience” now places greater emphasis on stronger fiscal institutions, improved revenue collection, and tighter oversight of state-owned enterprises to prevent new liabilities from weakening the public finances.
The energy and cocoa sectors will be particularly important. Persistent financial weaknesses in these areas can eventually become government liabilities, undermining the fiscal gains achieved through debt restructuring and expenditure control.
But the fiscal space created by the current recovery is not a permanent windfall. The IMF’s recommendation effectively gives Ghana some room to support development and social spending, while making that flexibility conditional on stronger institutions.
That may be the clearest test of whether the 17th IMF programme really can be Ghana’s last.
The immediate indicators will be revenue performance, expenditure controls, the accumulation of government arrears, the financial position of state-owned enterprises, and adherence to the new fiscal rules. If those systems hold after IMF financing ends, Ato Forson’s ambition will have a stronger foundation. If they weaken, Ghana could once again find that stabilisation under an IMF programme is easier than preserving it on its own.
