The Government of Ghana, through the Ministry of Local Government, is attempting to revamp the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system through Ayalolo after many years of failure.
The attempt to revive the BRT system brings back memories of how the country has missed the opportunity to become Sub-Saharan Africa’s first modern BRT system. When the Government of Ghana launched the ambitious Ghana Urban Transport Project (GUTP) in 2007, it carried a landmark vision to become Sub-Saharan Africa’s first modern Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system.
Designed to transform congestion-choked Accra with dedicated bus lanes, modern terminals, and reduced carbon emissions, the flagship project was meant to revolutionize urban transit.
However, according to a post-evaluation report by the World Bank in 2017, that grand ambition ended in failure. The World Bank evaluation document cited by The High Street Journal officially rated the overall outcome of the project as “Unsatisfactory,” noting that the dedicated BRT system was completely abandoned before a single bus could run on its exclusive lanes.
Instead of the state-of-the-art BRT line originally planned between Mallam Junction and Accra’s Central Business District, authorities were forced to downgrade the project to a scaled-down “Quality Bus Service” (QBS) operating in general traffic.
How Did Sub-Saharan Africa’s Pioneer BRT Vision Fail?
The World Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results Report enumerates a chain of severe structural, financial, and political failures which contributed to the collapse. The document cites, at least, 8 key reasons for the failure of a project with high hopes.
Incomplete Engineering Designs & Massive Cost Overruns
The World Bank assessment reveals that the project suffered from premature planning. It observes that full engineering designs and bidding documents for the BRT were not completed prior to project approval. As detailed designs were finalized during implementation, infrastructure costs ballooned uncontrollably.
For instance, expanding the Odaw Bridge and building a railway flyover jumped 60 percent in cost from $9.2 million to $14.7 million. Overall BRT infrastructure costs skyrocketed from an initial estimate of $46 million to $100.7 million, creating an insurmountable financial deficit.
Severe Government Counterpart Funding Shortfalls
While international donors provided credit, the Government of Ghana was required to supply $18 million in counterpart funding, including $12.3 million dedicated to BRT infrastructure.
Facing severe fiscal constraints, the government was able to deliver only about $1.0 million by the project’s closing date. Combined with budget overruns, this funding collapse made constructing the full BRT line impossible.
Outdated Urban Planning & Missing Data
The BRT system was planned without up-to-date land use data or an integrated urban transport master plan for Greater Accra.
Accra’s existing spatial development framework was already outdated when the project was designed, making it difficult to properly map out transit corridors and future mobility needs
Fragmented Governance & Lack of a Political Commitment
Managing urban transport in Accra was split across multiple competing ministries and municipal assemblies without clear coordination. Key responsibilities were divided between the Ministry of Roads and Highways, the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.
The project lacked an empowered national regulatory body and suffered from the absence of a dedicated, continuous political champion to push institutional reforms forward.
Financial Collapse of Newly Created Institutions
To manage the new transport regime, the project created specialized bodies such as the Center for Urban Transport (CUT). However, these agencies lacked sustainable operational funding.
Due to severe administrative and financial distress, the CUT was dissolved in 2014 before ever becoming fully functional.
Stiff Resistance from Informal Transit Operators
Public transport in Accra was long dominated by informal minibus (tro tro) operators represented by powerful unions like the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU). Operator groups strongly resisted route reorganization and feared losing their livelihoods.
Mitigation and communication efforts failed to unite stakeholders or establish agreed route assignments before the project ended.
Political Transitions & Bureaucratic Delays
The project spanned three different presidential administrations in Ghana. Leadership changes during political transition periods led to months of stalled contract approvals and sluggish fund disbursements. Additionally, frequent procurement delays further hindered physical progress.
Diversion of Funds for Emergency Disaster Repair
Faced with uncompleted works and looming deadlines, the project underwent multiple restructurings.
Following the catastrophic floods in Accra in June 2015, the remaining uncommitted project funds ($6.4 million) were redirected away from transport transit operations to cover emergency road, culvert, and drainage repairs.
The Bottomline
So now, if Ayalolo buses are back on the roads in a contra-flow arrangement this time around, remember Ghana has been there before, but it became a nine-day wonder.
In its final verdict, the World Bank concluded that attempting to roll out a complex, high-capacity BRT system alongside sweeping institutional reforms was simply “too ambitious” without secured funding, political continuity, and solid engineering preparation.
The question Ghanaians should ask is that have all the necessary preparatory works been made to make it sustainable?
