By Appiah Kusi Adomako, Esq
In March 2025, MultiChoice Ghana, the operator of DSTV, raised its subscription prices, triggering public backlash. Soon after, the Ghanaian cedi appreciated significantly against the US dollar, gaining roughly a third of its value. Despite the change in exchange rate, DSTV did not adjust its prices downward. From basic economics, a firm with no competitive pressure has little incentive to reduce prices, even when market conditions change.
On July 4, 2025, the Minister for Communications, Digital Technology and Innovation, Hon. Samuel Nartey George, met with MultiChoice and demanded a 30 percent price reduction to reflect the cedi’s appreciation. While commendable, this intervention highlights the underlying issue of Ghana’s lack of a comprehensive competition law that would hold dominant firms accountable and ensure fair market conduct.
Market Power and Pay-TV Monopoly
Market power refers to a firm’s ability to influence prices or output without being constrained by competitive forces. MultiChoice, though not officially designated a significant market power (SMP) by regulators, wields clear dominance. Through exclusive rights to premium content like the English Premier League (EPL) and UEFA Champions League, DSTV enjoys a unique position in Ghana’s pay-TV market. These content exclusivities create a bottleneck monopoly, where other players cannot compete effectively without access to the same content. Even if the sector is liberalized, no rival can match DSTV’s appeal without such programming rights.
This content lock-in restricts competition, reduces consumer choice, and entrenches market dominance. It also enables MultiChoice to set high prices without fear of losing subscribers to viable alternatives. This is where MultiChoice’s market power begins.
The Limits of Regulatory Interventions
The Minister’s call for a 30 percent price cut may bring temporary relief, but it is a short-term fix. In a deregulated market, prices are supposed to be determined by supply and demand, not government directives. Competitive and market forces are the drivers of prices and improve service quality. When firms lack competition, they can maintain inflated prices with little accountability.
Moreover, frequent regulatory interventions in liberalized sectors create uncertainty. Investors may view such actions as arbitrary, potentially deterring investment in the telecom and media markets. The more sustainable approach is to build a competitive environment that compels firms to lower prices and improve services voluntarily.
The Role of Competition Law
A sound competition law is needed to address abuse of dominance, price exploitation, and anti-competitive conduct. Competition law and regulatory tools have been used globally to challenge and moderate the effects of exclusive licensing of premium football content. Cases like Murphy v. Media Protection, interventions in Germany, and scrutiny in South Africa show that regulators can compel fairer market outcomes. In Germany, the Federal Cartel Office required the German Bundesliga to sell broadcast rights in a way that ensures no single buyer gets all rights.
This led to a no-single-buyer rule, ensuring more competition in the broadcasting of football in Germany. This prevents content from being used to entrench monopoly power.
Ghana’s long-pending Competition and Fair Trade Practices Bill, 2019, provides a comprehensive legal framework to regulate anti-competitive behavior. If enacted, it could address market power and exclusive licensing agreements between MultiChoice and its upstream content suppliers. This would reduce entry barriers, encourage more service providers, improve consumer choice, and drive prices down through healthy competition.
The law would also address harmful practices such as exclusive contracts, refusal to deal, predatory pricing, and market foreclosure, ensuring a level playing field.
Systemic Solutions Beyond Short-Term Fixes
While the Minister’s directive may serve consumer interests in the short term, it does not resolve the structural challenges in the pay-TV sector. The Electronic Communications Act, 2008 (Act 775), gives some regulatory power to the National Communications Authority (NCA), but its provisions are limited in scope and weak in addressing competition concerns.
The delay in passing the competition bill, nearly two decades after Ghana began developing it, has left the market exposed to monopolistic behavior. Encouragingly, both the 2024 NDC Manifesto and the 2025 Budget Statement (Paragraph 553) state that “the Trade Ministry will also undertake a comprehensive review of the Made-in-Ghana Products Policy, advocate for the passage of the Consumer Protection and Competition and Business Regulatory Reforms Commission Bill.”
Beyond DSTV, competition law is essential for other sectors in Ghana’s economy. It would promote transparency, stimulate innovation, and enhance market efficiency. It also aligns with the government’s 24-Hour Economy initiative by creating fairer business environments.
Multichoice might argue that pricing decisions are taken at a regional or continental level, but that does not absolve it of responsibility to Ghanaian consumers. If currency appreciation lowers operational costs, that benefit should reflect in local pricing. Only a proper competition regime can enforce this accountability in a consistent and fair manner.
The Way Forward: Passing the Competition Law
Ghana urgently needs to pass the Competition and Fair Trade Practices Bill. A coordinated effort between the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of Trade and Industry could fast-track the process. Enacting this law would empower regulators to monitor dominant firms, enforce fair licensing, and encourage competitive behavior across sectors.
A robust competition regime would protect consumers, attract investment, and ensure prices reflect market conditions and not monopoly dictates. It would also support the growth of local content and entrepreneurship in the media and telecom industries.
Conclusion
In conclusion, regulatory directives, while useful in specific moments, are no substitute for comprehensive legal and institutional frameworks. Passing the competition bill is not just timely, it is necessary for creating a balanced, efficient, and consumer-friendly economy. Article 12 (3) of the AfCFTA Protocol on Competition Policy mandates “State Parties without competition law and enforcement bodies to enact competition laws and establish competition enforcement bodies upon entry into force of this Protocol or their accession to the AfCFTA Agreement.” Ghana cannot be an effective player in the single African market without aligning with these standards.
NB: The writer is a lawyer and a competition economist, and a consumer protection advocate. He is the West Africa Regional Director of CUTS International. He can be contacted via email: [email protected] or www.cuts-accra.org or 0302-254-5652.
