Countries that believe some of their commitments under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are no longer suitable should engage the AfCFTA Secretariat and seek to amend them through the established process rather than unilaterally changing the rules, international trade expert Louis Yaw Afful has said.
The issue has become increasingly important as African governments seek to protect domestic businesses and sensitive sectors from growing competition while simultaneously pursuing the objectives of continental free trade.
But where does a country draw the line between protecting its national interests and honouring the commitments it has made under AfCFTA?
According to Afful, the answer is not for governments to simply disregard commitments they have already made.
“If you have a problem with what you have committed to, you go back and engage,” he explained in an interview with The High Street Journal.
So what happens when a country wants to change its commitment?
Afful said countries are not necessarily locked permanently into every position they take under AfCFTA.
If a government subsequently believes that a particular commitment needs to be changed, it should communicate this through the appropriate institutional channels.
That, he said, means engaging the AfCFTA Secretariat rather than introducing a unilateral restriction and leaving other African countries to discover the change after the fact.
The process is important because AfCFTA commitments are not simply domestic policy decisions. They form part of the framework governing how participating countries trade with one another.
Once a country makes commitments on the sectors and products it is willing to liberalise, other State Parties make decisions based on that information.
Afful therefore stressed the importance of transparency when a country wants to alter its position.
Why does the Secretariat matter?
The AfCFTA Secretariat plays an important role in administering and coordinating the implementation of the agreement.
Afful explained that when countries make changes to their commitments, those changes need to be properly communicated and reflected within the continental trading framework so that other countries know what has changed.
He referred to the Africa Trade Observatory as one of the platforms through which information on countries’ trade commitments and liberalisation schedules can be made available.
The broader concern, he suggested, is predictability.
A business in one African country should be able to understand the market-access conditions that apply in another country without having to worry that a commitment has been changed suddenly through a domestic policy announcement.
But what if the country genuinely needs protection?
This is where Afful’s argument becomes less about whether governments can protect domestic industries and more about how they do it.
AfCFTA already gives countries some flexibility to protect sensitive sectors as they progressively liberalise their markets.
Under the tariff liberalisation framework, 90% of tariff lines are to be liberalised, while 7% can be designated as sensitive products and liberalised over a longer period. A further 3% can be excluded from liberalisation, subject to the conditions of the agreement.
So, if a government believes that a particular sector is vulnerable, the question is not necessarily whether it has any room to protect that sector.
The question is whether it is using the flexibility available under AfCFTA and, where necessary, seeking changes through the appropriate process.
Afful’s position is that governments should not use “national interest” as a reason to simply walk away from commitments.
If a commitment has become problematic, he said, the appropriate response is to engage, negotiate and seek an amendment.
What happens if countries act alone?
The concern with unilateral restrictions is that they can create uncertainty and, potentially, retaliation.
If one country restricts businesses or market access in a way that affects another country’s interests, the affected country may feel compelled to respond.
Afful warned that this could gradually turn individual domestic measures into a wider cycle of retaliatory trade restrictions.
That would run against the broader objective of AfCFTA, which is to create a more predictable and integrated African market.
For him, the institutional process therefore matters just as much as the policy objective.
Countries can identify problems with their commitments. They can seek to protect sensitive sectors. They can even seek changes to the commitments they have made.
But they should do so through engagement with the AfCFTA framework rather than by simply changing the rules on their own.
And that, Afful argues, is critical if African countries are to protect domestic interests while still building the trust and predictability required for AfCFTA to work.
