The dissolution of the marriage between business magnate Richard Nii Armah Quaye and his former wife, Joana Quaye, might have passed as just another high profile divorce case. But since the public became aware of the High Court’s ruling, and the subsequent appeal, it has evolved into something far bigger. It has become a national conversation about law, fairness, gender, and the meaning of marriage itself.
At the centre of the storm is a decision delivered on 20 January 2026 by Justice Kofi Dorgu, a Justice of the Court of Appeal sitting as an additional High Court judge. In distributing the marital property, the court awarded the petitioner what many have described as a modest financial relief of GH¢300,000, far below the GH¢50 million she had sought.
For a woman described as a co-founder, shareholder, and director of the business at the heart of the respondent’s wealth, the award has raised eyebrows. Even more controversial, however, was the reasoning.
When the Bench Speaks Beyond the Law
In justifying the award, the court indicated that the sum was intended, in part, to discourage what it described as a growing trend of frequent divorces with the expectation of reaping huge monetary benefits. Then came the line that ignited public debate.
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In what appeared to be an attempt to soften the outcome, the court noted that the petitioner was physically very much attractive and capable of remarrying anytime she felt like.
That remark has since taken on a life of its own.
Critics, including Nana Oye Bampoe Addo, a lawyer, gender advocate, and Deputy Chief of Staff (Administration), have questioned its relevance. What, they ask, “does a woman’s physical appearance or remarriage prospects have to do with her legal entitlement upon divorce?”
Supporters, however, argue that such considerations may legitimately inform the court’s assessment of financial need and future prospects.
The divide reveals a deeper tension, not just about this case, but about what factors should properly guide judicial discretion in divorce settlements.
The Supreme Court, in Anyetei v Anyetei, made it clear that trial judges must not base property awards on subjective factors like a spouse’s beauty. Pwamang JSC noted in that case that relief should be determined by matrimonial contributions, conduct during the marriage, and reasons for its breakdown. He then described the trial judge’s reliance on personal opinions about the wife’s beauty as “unfortunate.” Against this legal backdrop, Justice Dorgu’s comment appears at best misplaced, and at worst, a step backward.
The Law Has Not Always Looked Like This
To understand the controversy, one must step back. In the 1959 case of Quartey v Martey, the court held firmly that property acquired during marriage, even with the support of the wife and children, belonged solely to the man under customary law. The wife’s contribution was treated as part of her duty.
Forobvious reasons, that position could not endure.
In Yeboah v Yeboah, the courts began recognising substantial contributions, including non-financial efforts such as supervising construction to award female spouses what they fairly deserved. Then came a more decisive shift.
In Gladys Mensah v Stephen Mensah, the Supreme Court embraced the principle that equality is equity. A wife’s domestic role, maintaining the home, raising children, and supporting the husband, was considered sufficient to justify an equal share in marital property.
For years, that principle shaped the law. It enjoyed an undisturbed dominance, like a tide that seemed too settled to ever turn.
A Quiet but Significant Shift
The law could not stand still.
In Owusu Sarpong v Owusu Sarpong, the Supreme Court, speaking through Ackah Boafo JSC, made it clear that spousal entitlement should no longer be framed as an automatic equal division. Instead, the court endorsed a more nuanced approach grounded in equity and sensitive to the realities of each case.
The court emphasised that distribution must be anchored in joint acquisition and assessed through factors such as the duration of the marriage, the source of the property, financial and non financial contributions, and the overall circumstances of the parties.
This marked a decisive movement away from rigid equality toward structured judicial discretion.
So Where Does the Quaye Case Sit?
Viewed against this evolving legal background, the High Court’s decision invites more questions than it answers. One question that keeps lingering on the mind is what exactly the court is doing here?
Is this an attempt to faithfully apply the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Owusu Sarpong v Owusu Sarpong? Indeed, the modest monetary award, alongside a defined share of the matrimonial home, could suggest as much.
But the reasoning points further.
By stating that the award was made “as a way of dissuading these frequent divorces with the expectation of reaping huge monetary benefits,” the court appears to introduce a policy concern that goes beyond contribution and equity. It raises the possibility that the court is not only distributing property, but also signalling a stance on the perceived motivations behind some modern marriages.
There is an even more difficult question. Does this decision hint at a quiet return to the more restrained approach to awarding female spouses of a share of the marital property upon divorce? We thought the courts had gradually moved away from this in favour of substantive fairness.
However it is framed, the case sits at a crossroads. It may be an application of a new doctrine, an extension of it, or the beginning of something else entirely.
Marriage Is Not an Investment, Or Is It?
Beyond the legal analysis, the case has reopened a deeper social question. Is marriage becoming, for some, an economic strategy?
There is a growing perception, fair or not, that in unions involving wealthy individuals, one party may enter the relationship with an expectation of financial gain upon its breakdown. The trial judge’s remarks suggest that the court itself is alive to this concern.
But that position is not without danger. To frame divorce settlements as a deterrent against opportunism risks undermining the constitutional goal of protecting spouses, particularly women, from historical economic disadvantage.
The Appeal and the Road Ahead
The appeal now filed by the petitioner presents the Appellate Courts with an opportunity to do more than resolve a dispute between two individuals. It presents an opportunity to clarify the direction of Ghana’s law on marital property.
Will the court reaffirm the shift toward contribution sensitive distribution? Will it address the place, if any, of subjective considerations in judicial reasoning? Or will it recalibrate the balance altogether?
For now, the country watches. Because this case is no longer just about two people. It is about what marriage means, what fairness demands, and how far the law should go in balancing both.
