The return of former Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC) Chief Executive Officer, Sedina Tamakloe Attionu, to Ghana following her extradition from the United States has reignited public interest in one of the country’s most prominent corruption prosecutions.
While her return paves the way for the enforcement of the ten-year custodial sentence imposed by the Accra High Court, it also draws attention to several legal questions arising from the conduct of the trial, the appeal already pending before the Court of Appeal, the possibility of bail pending appeal, and the computation of a sentence imposed on a person convicted in absentia.
Can a person lawfully be tried and convicted in his or her absence? Does extradition affect a pending appeal? Can a convicted fugitive be admitted to bail pending appeal? And when does a sentence begin to run where the accused was not physically present when it was pronounced?
For the most part, Ghanaian law provides answers to these questions. The challenge lies not so much in the absence of legal rules, but in their application to a case whose facts have tested the limits of criminal procedure and international cooperation.
Trial in Absentia: A Constitutionally Recognised Exception
One of the enduring misconceptions surrounding criminal proceedings is that a trial cannot continue without the accused person being physically present before the court. The Attionu case demonstrates that this proposition is not absolute.
After the commencement of her trial, Attionu obtained leave in 2021 to travel to the United States for medical treatment. She subsequently failed to return despite repeated notices and efforts aimed at securing her attendance.
Article 19(3) of the 1992 Constitution creates specific exceptions to the general right of an accused person to be present at his or her trial. Article 19(3)(a) permits criminal proceedings to continue where the accused refuses to appear after being duly notified. Trial in absentia is therefore not a matter of unfettered judicial discretion but one grounded in express constitutional authority. The burden falls on the court to be satisfied that the accused has been properly notified and has refused, rather than merely failed, to appear.
The statutory framework is found in section 170 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30). Section 170(1) empowers a court, in appropriate circumstances, to proceed as though the accused were present. However, section 170(5) places a limitation on that power in cases involving felonies by requiring the court to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused rather than proceeding in absence.
Consequently, the classification of the offences for which Attionu was charged is not a mere technical matter. Whether the High Court acted within the confines of section 170, having regard to the nature of the charges, may well constitute one of the issues to be examined by the Court of Appeal.
Section 170(3) further provides that where a person convicted in absentia establishes that his or her absence was occasioned by causes beyond his or her control and that there exists a probable defence on the merits, the court may set aside the conviction. Whether this provision becomes relevant in the course of the appeal remains to be seen.
The Appeal Is Already Pending
Ordinarily, a convicted person who fails to appeal within the statutory period must first obtain an extension of time before invoking the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. The Attionu case presents a different scenario.
Reports indicate that she lodged her appeal shortly after her conviction in 2024. The issue is therefore no longer whether she may appeal out of time. The appeal is already before the Court of Appeal and awaits determination.
Among the issues reportedly raised are whether the continuation of the proceedings in her absence satisfied the constitutional requirements of Article 19(3) and whether the ten-year sentence imposed by the High Court was excessive in the circumstances.
The Court of Appeal will not conduct a fresh trial. Rather, it will review the record of proceedings to determine whether the trial was conducted according to law, whether the evidence justified the convictions, and whether there was any substantial miscarriage of justice. Depending on its findings, the court may affirm the convictions, vary the sentence, or, in appropriate circumstances, order a retrial before the High Court.
Bail Pending Appeal
Although convicted persons do not enjoy an automatic right to bail pending appeal, the law permits an application to be made in deserving cases. The exercise of this discretion is generally reserved for exceptional circumstances and substantial grounds of appeal. The court is also concerned with the likelihood that the applicant will submit to the judicial process if released.
In Attionu’s case, the fact that she left Ghana with the court’s permission and subsequently failed to return until extradition proceedings secured her presence is likely to weigh heavily against any such application. The history of her absence would inevitably raise concerns regarding the risk of flight and the enforceability of any sentence ultimately upheld on appeal. Any application for bail would need to squarely address that history.
When Did the Sentence Begin to Run?
Perhaps no aspect of the case has generated as much public debate as the question whether a person convicted in absentia begins serving her sentence immediately upon conviction.
At first glance, section 315 of Act 30 appears to suggest that a sentence takes effect from the date on which it is pronounced. Read in isolation, that provision might create the impression that a portion of Attionu’s ten-year sentence had already elapsed while she remained abroad and at liberty.
Section 170(4) of Act 30, however, provides a specific answer to situations involving convictions in absentia. The provision requires the court to issue a warrant for the execution of the sentence and further stipulates that where the convicted person is subsequently apprehended pursuant to that warrant, the sentence commences from the date of apprehension, not the date of pronouncement.
The effect of the provision is unambiguous. A fugitive does not accumulate sentence credit while evading justice. In Attionu’s case, the ten-year sentence would commence from the date she was taken into lawful custody following her return to Ghana, rather than from the date of her conviction in 2024. The legislature, in enacting section 170(4), plainly anticipated and foreclosed the possibility that a convicted person could serve a custodial sentence while living freely outside the jurisdiction.
What may still attract legal scrutiny is whether the procedural steps contemplated by section 170(4), including the issuance and proper execution of the relevant warrant and the endorsement of the date of apprehension, were fully complied with. These are not mere formalities, but constitute the statutory mechanism by which the commencement date of the sentence is established, and any irregularity in that process could itself become a ground of legal argument.
A Case With Implications Beyond One Individual
The significance of the Attionu case extends beyond the circumstances of a single convicted person.
It illustrates how Ghana’s criminal procedure framework seeks to balance the constitutional rights of accused persons with the practical realities of administering justice where an accused deliberately places herself beyond the reach of the courts. It also demonstrates that the law has anticipated many of the challenges associated with trials conducted in absentia and the subsequent apprehension of convicted fugitives, even if the application of those rules in practice requires close attention.
As cross-border criminal enforcement becomes increasingly common and extradition mechanisms are more frequently invoked, questions concerning trial in absentia, the rights of returning convicts, and the execution of custodial sentences are likely to arise with greater frequency. The pending appeal therefore presents the Court of Appeal with an opportunity not only to determine the fate of Sedina Tamakloe Attionu, but also to provide clarity on important aspects of Ghana’s criminal procedure regime.
Her extradition may have brought an end to years of uncertainty concerning her whereabouts, but it has not brought the legal debate surrounding the MASLOC case to a close. The appeal now pending before the Court of Appeal, together with the questions concerning the propriety of the trial process and compliance with the statutory framework governing convictions in absentia, ensures that the final chapter of this case has yet to be written.
