In the news now is a constitutionally sensitive matter: the petitions seeking the removal of the leadership of the Electoral Commission of Ghana and the Special Prosecutor could not survive the required thresholds. They could not disclose sufficient substance to warrant further inquiry.
The procedure has run its course. The more enduring conversation is what this moment says about the place of independent institutions in Ghana’s constitutional order.
The Age of the “Watchdog” Institution
The Electoral Commission and the Office of the Special Prosecutor were not created as routine public offices. They were established as guardians of sensitive democratic functions. One manages the machinery of elections. The other confronts corruption, often in complex and high-level settings.
Over the last three decades, constitutions across Africa have increasingly created similar bodies. They do not sit neatly within the Executive, Legislature, or Judiciary. Yet they exercise significant authority. They are hybrids. They regulate elections. They investigate corruption. They supervise compliance. They sometimes embarrass governments. At other times, they frustrate oppositions.
Their growth reflects a recognition that traditional checks and balances, by themselves, may not be sufficient to secure transparency and accountability. It requires specialised guardians.
But guardians, by their nature, attract suspicion. The more consequential their mandate, the more intense the political reactions to their decisions.
The Balance Between Protection and Responsibility
The language of independence is powerful. It is, in fact, central to the credibility of these institutions. If their leadership could be unsettled with ease, their work would inevitably be influenced by the fear of removal. Stability, therefore, is not about protecting personalities. It is about protecting institutional function.
At the same time, independence cannot mean insulation from scrutiny. Constitutional systems provide pathways for removal precisely because no public office is beyond accountability.
The recent outcome, therefore, is not just about failed petitions. It is about the resilience of constitutional design against the politicisation of removal rhetoric.
If the leadership of accountability institutions can be unsettled every time political dissatisfaction peaks, independence becomes fragile. Decisions begin to orbit around survival rather than principle.Security of tenure exists to prevent precisely that drift.
‘Incompetence’ as Basis for Removing High Public Office Holders
One of the grounds reportedly invoked in the petitions was incompetence. The now notorious article 146 of the Constitution lists incompetence as a basis for removing certain office holders, including those targeted in the petitions. What it does not do is define the term. In law, incompetence is not a loose expression of dissatisfaction. It is a term easier cited than precisely defined.
One well-known case often cited in discussions of incompetence is Re Mason and the Registered Nurses Association of B.C. (102 DLR (3rd) 225). In that case, it was explained that the meaning of the word incompetence must be shaped by the purpose of the provision in which it appears. It generally refers to a lack of ability, capacity or fitness for the office in question.
Therefore, negligence and incompetence are not the same. A competent official may make mistakes without being incompetent. Even a serious error does not, by itself, establish constitutional unfitness. It is only where there is sustained inability, habitual negligence, or a persistent failure to properly discharge the duties of office that incompetence may arise. That distinction is crucial. Constitutional removal is concerned with enduring incapacity, not isolated controversy.
The Discipline of Process
Perhaps the most important lesson in this is procedural discipline.
Democratic politics thrives on contestation and constitutional democracy survives on restraint. Public officials will be criticised. Institutions will face pressure. What sustains constitutional order is not the absence of conflict but the presence of process.
Where procedures exist, they must be followed. Where standards are set, they must be applied. Where determinations are made within the law, they must be respected unless lawfully challenged.
When the constitutional process yields a conclusion that further inquiry is not warranted, that is not an endorsement of perfection. It is an affirmation that the threshold for destabilising constitutionally protected offices has not been met.
That distinction safeguards the rule of law from becoming hostage to political temperature.
Looking Ahead
Public institutions that manage elections and prosecute corruption will always exist at the centre of controversy. That is the nature of their work. Their strength will, above all, depend not only on the protections the Constitution affords them, but also on the quality of their work.
Public confidence is earned over time. It grows when institutions act consistently, transparently and within the law. Hybrid institutions of accountability were created because ordinary checks and balances were thought to be insufficient. If they are to avoid becoming symbolic fixtures, they must demonstrate that they enhance openness, responsiveness, and integrity in public life.
The Constitution has done its part by insulating them from unstable removal pressures. The rest is institutional character.
