Consolidated Bank Ghana (CBG) was born out of the crisis. Created in 2018 as the centerpiece of Ghana’s financial sector clean-up, it was the government’s answer to the collapse of multiple private banks whose licenses were revoked for insolvency and regulatory breaches. CBG became a resolution vehicle, taking over the assets and liabilities of these failed institutions to protect depositors, stabilize confidence, and preserve essential banking services.
Nearly seven years later, however, the project remains unfinished business. While CBG has survived, and even grown into one of Ghana’s largest banks by branch network, questions about its long-term ownership, governance, and strategy have never been fully settled.
Now those questions are resurfacing with new urgency. In 2025, as the government announced a major recapitalization of another troubled state bank, NIB, it signaled that CBG would be next. Finance Ministry officials have indicated plans to recapitalize CBG in 2026. But that pledge is complicated by a lingering, thorny dispute: what to do about the original owners of the banks whose collapse gave birth to CBG in the first place.
The Ownership Puzzle
Ever since their licenses were revoked, the shareholders of those failed banks have pressed for redress. Some want their licenses restored outright, effectively unwinding the consolidation and letting their old banks come back. Others have floated a more pragmatic alternative: if the government will not restore the licenses, then they should be compensated with equity in CBG itself, given that CBG absorbed their assets.
This idea isn’t just speculation. Prominent figures in Ghana’s banking sector, including former CAL Bank MD Frank Adu Jnr., have publicly proposed that the government settle the dispute by granting former owners shares in CBG. Such a move would partially privatize CBG, reduce the state’s fiscal burden, and potentially bring new oversight and accountability.
But the government has never committed to that path. Officially, CBG remains wholly state-owned and managed, with no private shareholders. While authorities have hinted that “all options are on the table,” there is no clear timetable or mechanism for resolving the legal and political tangle of claims from former bank owners.
Until that issue is settled, any recapitalization plan remains clouded in uncertainty. Will the government continue to pour public money into a fully state-owned bank? Or will it use recapitalization as the moment to restructure CBG’s ownership and governance, inviting private capital, including potentially controversial former owners?
Lessons from ADB and NIB
For many observers, this choice is critical because of the cautionary tales provided by Ghana’s other state-owned banks.
The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange in 2016, raising private capital and promising new transparency. Yet the government retained dominant ownership and control. Board appointments continued to track political cycles, and lending decisions often followed policy priorities rather than strict commercial logic. Even after its partial privatization, ADB has repeatedly needed fresh capital from the state, including new pledges of support in 2026 to repair balance sheet damage from the domestic debt exchange.
NIB’s story is even starker. Decades of chronic undercapitalization, non-performing loans, and political patronage culminated in this year’s massive GH¢1.4 billion government bailout. Despite new promises of governance reform, critics fear NIB will remain trapped in the same cycle of interference and fiscal drain.
The lesson for CBG is clear. If the government simply recapitalizes it in 2026 without fixing ownership and governance, it risks repeating the same story: a politically directed lender that serves as a conduit for policy goals, undermines commercial discipline, and eventually requires yet another taxpayer-funded rescue.
A Fork in the Road
For CBG, the 2026 recapitalization is an opportunity and a test. The government could use it to restructure ownership, invite private capital, and reduce direct political control. It could finally settle the claims of former bank owners, bringing legal closure and perhaps new investors into the fold. Or it could double down on full state ownership, keeping CBG as a permanent state bank with all the familiar risks of interference and mismanagement.
Ultimately, the question is whether Ghana is willing to learn from the experiences of ADB and NIB, and avoid creating yet another state bank that is chronically dependent on the public purse.
